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A central component of mind wandering is mental time travel, the calling to mind of
remembered past events and of imagined future ones. Mental time travel may also
be critical to the evolution of language, which enables us to communicate about the
non-present, sharing memories, plans, and ideas. Mental time travel is indexed in humans
by hippocampal activity, and studies also suggest that the hippocampus in rats is active
when the animals replay or pre play activity in a spatial environment, such as a maze.
Mental time travel may have ancient origins, contrary to the view that it is unique to
humans. Since mental time travel is also thought to underlie language, these findings
suggest that language evolved gradually from pre-existing cognitive capacities, contrary to
the view of Chomsky and others that language and symbolic thought emerged abruptly,
in a single step, within the past 100,000 years.
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INTRODUCTION
If people are left to think for themselves undisturbed, with-
out focusing on the immediate environment or on a particular
task, their minds wander. Brain-imaging studies show that mind-
wandering activates a widespread network in the brain, first
identified and described by Raichle et al. (2001) as the default
mode network, in which the frontal and parietal lobes play a major
role. Rather paradoxically, this network is revealed by reverse
subtraction; that is, the activation during involvement in some
designated task is subtracted from that under passive conditions
in which subjects were given no explicit instructions, and were
free to let their minds wander (Buckner and Vincent, 2007).
Indeed, blood flow to the brain under passive conditions is only
about 5–10 percent lower than to the engaged brain, and cov-
ers wider regions of the brain. It has been estimated that people
spend just under half their waking hours in mind wandering
(Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010).
A critical component of mind wandering is memory, which
provides the basic elements from which our mind wanderings are
constructed. Memory itself can be divided into declarative mem-
ory, which can be made explicit or conscious, and non-declarative
memory, which comprises the non-conscious products of learn-
ing, such as habits or learned skills like driving or playing the
piano. Declarative memory, in turn, can be divided into episodic
memory, which is personalmemory for past episodes, and seman-
tic memory, which is basic knowledge about the world (Squire,
2004). According to Tulving (1972), episodic memory is unique
to humans.
Memory, both episodic and semantic (Klein, 2013), pro-
vides the ingredients for imagining possible future events. What
has been termed episodic foresight (Suddendorf, 2010), along
with autobiographic memory and theory of mind, also makes
up much of our mind wandering (Spreng and Grady, 2009),
as we preview some future activity or consider possible future
options in order to select appropriate action. The capacity to
mentally relive past events and imagine possible future ones
comprises has been termed mental time travel (Suddendorf and
Corballis, 1997, 2007), taking us into an imagined future as
well as into an imagined past. Both are essentially constructive
processes. Brain imaging shows considerable overlap in brain
activation between the two, with slightly more frontal-lobe activ-
ity in imagining the future (e.g., Addis et al., 2007). Critical to
both is the hippocampus, whose role is discussed in more detail
below.
IS MENTAL TIME TRAVEL UNIQUE TO HUMANS?
He said “What’s time? Now is for dogs and apes!Man has Forever!”
—Robert Browning, A grammarian’s funeral
Extending Tulving’s conjecture, Suddendorf and Corballis (1997,
2007) suggested that mental time travel, like episodic memory,
is uniquely human. This suggestion, though, has proven con-
tentious. A serious challenge has come from studies of a number
of non-human species, including birds. For instance, scrub jays
can recover cached food on the basis not only of where it was
cached, but also of when it was cached, which might be taken to
imply episodic memory of the caching episode itself (e.g., Clayton
et al., 2003). Jays also appear to select food to cache based not on
present hunger, but on the basis of what they expect to have access
to on the following day (Correia et al., 2007). Chimpanzees have
been shown to select tools for future use (Osvath and Osvath,
2008) or to collect and conceal stones to be later thrown at vis-
itors to the zoo (Osvath, 2011). In these and other studies there
are methodological issues, and questions as to whether the results
can be interpreted in terms of associative learning rather than the
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imagining of past or future events (see Suddendorf and Corballis,
2007 for a critique).
One problem in documenting mental time travel in non-
human species is their lack of language. In humans, we have
immediate evidence for both episodic memory and future think-
ing by simply asking for verbal report. Indeed, language itself
may have evolved precisely to allow communication about the
non-present (Corballis, 2009; Gärdenfors and Osvath, 2010), so
we can share our mental travels to other places and other times.
The absence of articulate language in non-human species may
therefore be considered evidence of incapacity for mental time
travel itself. Recent evidence from neurophysiology, though, sug-
gests that non-human animalsmay indeed have the capacity for at
least limited mental time travel, even though they do not have the
means to communicate it. A default mode network homologous
to that in humans has been identified in the monkey (Vincent
et al., 2007), and does suggest a basis for mind wandering, if not
for mental time travel itself. More critical, though, may be the
hippocampus, which performs two important roles in mammals,
as well as in birds.
First, the hippocampus contains so-called “place cells” that
encode where an animal is located in space, and so constitute
what O’Keefe and Nadel (1978) called a “cognitive map.” This role
appears to apply to humans as well as to other mammalian species
(Maguire et al., 1998). For example, London taxi drivers, who are
required to memorize the streets of London in sufficient detail
to navigate without referring to a map or GPS, have enlarged hip-
pocampi relative to controls—although not all trainees manage to
finish the course and these show no structural change (Woollett
and Maguire, 2011). The taxi drivers also have larger hippocampi
than do London bus drivers, who drive on designated routes
that impose relatively small demands on memory (Maguire et al.,
2006). Similarly, birds that cache items of food in multiple loca-
tions, and later retrieve them, have larger hippocampi than birds
that do not cache (Macphail, 2002).
Second, the hippocampus appears to be critically involved in
declarative memory systems and, in humans at least, in mental
time travel generally. Loss of hippocampal function in humans
results in severe amnesia, including an apparent inability to imag-
ine possible future events as well as failure to recall past ones
(Hassabis et al., 2007a,b; Andelman et al., 2010; Race et al., 2011).
Conversely, the hippocampus is activated in neurologically intact
individuals when they bring to mind past episodes and imagine
possible ones As suggested earlier, the hippocampus appears to be
the hub of the system, drawing detailed information from other
regions of the brain, including the default-mode network (Addis
et al., 2007), for the reconstruction of past or future events. There
is some differentiation along the long axis of the hippocampus,
with the posterior hippocampus more involved in storage and
the retrieval of past episodes and the anterior hippocampus more
activated by the imagining of future ones (Szpunar et al., 2007;
Martin et al., 2011).
Micro-electrode recordings suggest that the hippocampus may
play a similar role in rats. Place cells in the rat hippocampus,
which encode specific locations in a structured environment, such
as a maze, also fire when the animal is outside that environment,
sometimes when the animal is asleep (Wilson and McNaughton,
1994) and sometimes when it is awake but immobile (Karlsson
and Frank, 2009). Recordings show that this firing occurs in what
have been termed sharp-wave ripples, sweeping out trajectories
corresponding to earlier locations in the environment. These rip-
ples are accompanied by widespread activation in the cerebral
cortex, along with inhibition of activity in the diencephalon, lim-
bic system, and brain stem, suggesting an interaction between
hippocampus and cortex in the consolidation of acquired awake
experience (Logothetis et al., 2012). It might also be interpreted
as representing the experiencing of trajectories, either previ-
ously experienced or planned (Corballis, 2013)—in other words,
mental time travel.
This is further suggested by evidence that the trajectories need
not correspond to actual trajectories that the animal took while
it was in the environment. Sometimes they correspond to a pre-
viously taken path in a maze, but sometimes to the reverse of
such paths, or even to paths through regions the rat did not actu-
ally visit (Gupta et al., 2010). This might be taken as evidence
for mental time travel along not only past trajectories, but also
along imagined future ones. More direct evidence that hippocam-
pal activity signals future behavior comes from rats trained to
alternate left and right turns at a particular location in a maze.
Between trials, they were introduced to a running wheel, and
while they were running differential activity in the hippocampus
signaled which turn they would take next. Based on this and other
findings, the authors concluded that self-organized activity in the
hippocampus, “having evolved for the computation of distances,
can also support the episodic recall of events and the planning of
action sequences and goals” (Pastalkova et al., 2008, p. 1327).
A similar conclusion is suggested by a more recent study in
which rats were given experience with 36 locations in an open-
field environment, and learned that a particular goal location con-
tained a reward. When located in randomly chosen locations, the
rats were able to determine routes leading back to the goal, even
though these routes had not been previously traversed. Sharp-
wave ripples pre-played these routes prior to the animal actually
setting out (Pfeiffer and Foster, 2013). The authors suggest that
the hippocampus “function in multiple conceptual contexts: as a
cognitive map in which routes to goals might be explored flexibly
before behavior, as an episodic memory system engaging in what
has been termed ‘mental time travel’ . . . ” (p. 5).
The trajectories implied by the hippocampal sharp-wave rip-
ples are muchmore rapid than those actually taken by the animal.
Diba and Buzsáki (2007) recorded hippocampal firing while rats
ran back and forth along a straight track. Before each run, the
ripples indicated a forward “preplay” of the next run, and after
each run a second bout of ripples indicated a “replay” of the run
in reverse order. These events were an order of magnitude faster
than the sequence recorded during the run itself. While this may
suggest that the ripples are not evidence of mental time travel, I
suspect our own mental time travels are also speeded up. It takes
me an hour to walk from my home to where I work, but mentally
it takes less than a minute. Diba and Buzsáki suggest that “pre-
play events may have a role in ‘planning’ upcoming trajectories”
(p. 1242).
These findings, together with the role of the hippocampus is
human mental time travel, suggest a strong thread of continuity
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between rat and human. Indeed, mental time travel in the sense
of imagined journeys through space may well have evolved very
early as a consequence of movement, and the need to be aware of
location and to remember and plan movement through space. It
is understandable, too, that the hippocampus should play a role
in time as well as in space, since movement in time necessarily
involved trajectories in space. That is, the hippocampus oper-
ates in 4D space-time. Mental travel, moreover, has one property
denied actual travel, in that it can reverse time. We can mentally
relive the past, and also imagine events in the reverse order of their
actual occurrence, and it seems that rats can do so too.
Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that mental time travel
in humans is more complex than that in the rat. Darwin (1871)
famously wrote that “The difference in mind between man and
the higher animals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not
of kind” (p. 126). Our own recollections of past events and imag-
inings of future ones are populated by more than just locations.
We remember individual people, actions, objects, emotions, and
so forth, and these are present in different combinations in dif-
ferent episodes. Of course we do not yet know whether ripples in
the rat hippocampus can signal more than location, and in future
research it might be useful to add features or other distinctive
characters to the environments in which animals are located, and
seek markers in later hippocampal recordings. But for the time
being, it seems reasonable to suppose that our imaginings of past
and future carry a complexity far greater than that experienced by
other species.
LANGUAGE
As suggested earlier, language may be considered to have evolved
so that we can share ourmental time travels, and indeed any expe-
rience or knowledge not tied to the immediate environment. If
mental time travel is indeed unique to our species, this might well
explain why language itself is also confined to Homo sapiens. But
if the origins of mental time travel reach far back in mammalian
evolution, and perhaps even to our joint ancestry with birds, then
language itself may be considered to have precursors that long
preceded the emergence of our species. This notion, though, is
sharply contradicted by a contemporary view that language and
the thought processes underlying it emerged de novo well within
the time span of Homo sapiens.
Chomsky (2010), for instance, argues that language evolved in
a single step, perhaps as a mutation in a single individual, within
the past 100,000 years, long after the emergence of Homo sapiens
some 200,000 years ago in Africa. He writes
Within some small group from which we are all descended, a
rewiring of the brain took place in some individual, call him
Prometheus, yielding the operation of unbounded Merge, apply-
ing to concepts with intricate (and little understood) properties
(Chomsky, 2010, p. 59).
Chomsky is also clear that the outcome of this rewiring was
a new mode of thought, called internal language (I-language),
which was not primarily concerned with communication itself.
The mapping of I-language onto external language (E-language)
was in effect a secondary outcome. The 7000 or so languages of
the present-day world are then considered to have their basis in a
shared I-language.
The paleoanthropologist Ian Tattersall reaches a similar con-
clusion as to the abruptness with which language and symbolic
thought emerged:
Our ancestors made an almost unimaginable transition from a
non-symbolic, nonlinguistic way of processing information and
communicating information about the world to the symbolic and
linguistic condition we enjoy today. It is a qualitative leap in cog-
nitive state unparalleled in history. Indeed, as I’ve said, the only
reason we have for believing that such a leap could ever have been
made, is that it was made. And it seems to have been made well
after the acquisition by our species of its distinctive modern form
(Tattersall, 2012, p. 199).
Such views are profoundly at odds with Darwin’s theory of evolu-
tion by natural selection, and smack of the miraculous. According
to Pinker and Bloom (1990), evolution proceeds in small incre-
ments rather than in a single “unimaginable” leap. Indeed Darwin
himself wrote:
If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed, which
could not possibly have been formed by numerous, successive,
slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break down. But
I can find no such case (Darwin, 1859, p. 158).
Chomsky (e.g., 2011, p. 6) has frequently referred to language as
“an organ of the body,” so language might indeed be the case that
Darwin feared.
The idea that mental time travel has more ancient roots raises
the possibility of a more gradual scenario, and one more con-
sistent with Darwinian theory. Mental time travel itself may
well have undergone progressive refinement and extension before
reaching a level that might support language. Gärdenfors and
Osvath (2010) suggest that the critical period was the Oldowan,
dating from some 2.6 to about 1.6 million years ago (Plummer,
2004), and defined by the emergence of stone tools. They describe
the Oldowan as a “long ranging culture,” characterized by an
extension in time and space. The Oldowan hominins ranged over
large distances to gain raw materials or to scavenge or slaughter
for food, and long time intervals intervened between the man-
ufacture and use of tools. Gärdenfors and Osvath suggest that
this heightened the reliance on prospective cognition, which they
consider the basis for the subsequent emergence of symbolic com-
munication. The emergence of tools may have added complexity
to the activities of these early hominins, and indeed to their men-
tal time travels, creating further selective pressure toward more
effective communication.
Perhaps more critical than mental time travel per se, though,
were the adaptive advantages to be gained by sharing memo-
ries and plans with others. Mental time travel, including memory
and prospective cognition, has probably long served to the ben-
efit of the individual, but the ability to share has vast potential
to enhance experience and increase survival, at both individ-
ual and societal levels. The Pleistocene, the epoch that began
with the Oldowan, is widely recognized as the period in which
hominins came to occupy what has been termed the “cognitive
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niche” (Tooby and DeVore, 1987), depending on social bonding
and enhanced communication for survival in the more exposed
and dangerous environment of the African savanna. Social shar-
ing seems to be ingrained in humans in a manner not evident
in our closest non-human relatives. Tomasello (2008) notes, for
example, that infants point to interesting objects in their environ-
ments, not to request them, but to share the experience with those
around them. This may be a precursor to language, in phylogeny
as well as ontogeny. Chimpanzees, in contrast, rarely point, and
when they do the aim is usually to request something out of their
reach.
Underpinning social cognition is theory of mind, the capac-
ity to understand what others think or believe. Some 35 years
ago Premack and Woodruff (1978) raised the question, “Does
the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?” They were themselves
equivocal as to the answer, and their question has led to a long
and at times bitter controversy. In a review, Call and Tomasello
(2008) conclude that the years of subsequent research have shown
chimpanzees to have some understanding of the goals, intentions,
perceptions, and knowledge of others, but no understanding of
the beliefs and desires of others. True theory of mind, then
appears to be limited to humans, at least among extant species,
and may well have emerged as a critical aspect of what has also
been called the “social mind” as it evolved during the Pleistocene
(e.g., Forgas et al., 2007).
The incorporation of theory of mind adds a further dimen-
sion to mind wandering; as Buckner et al. (2008) put it, “the
default network is active when individuals are engaged in inter-
nally focused tasks including autobiographical memory retrieval,
envisioning the future, and conceiving the perspectives of others”
(p. 1). That is, we can wander mentally not only into past and
future, but also into the minds of others. This is well illustrated by
the human predilection for story-telling, whether through gossip,
fiction, or TV soaps.
Indeed, theory of mind can be regarded as a prerequisite for
language itself. Grice (1975) pointed out that language depends
on inference rather than explicit decoding. In this respect it
contrasts with animal communication, which is generally unam-
biguous, whereas human language, despite its apparent richness,
is characteristically ambiguous and imprecise. In order to con-
verse, individuals must understand what is going on in each
other’s minds, so that each can infer what the other means. As an
example of the ambiguity of language, Sperber and Origgi (2010)
give the sentence “It was too slow.” This could mean anything
from a chemical reaction being too slow, to the decrease in unem-
ployment in France being too slow, to a car being too slow for
an anticipated journey—or a sluggish movement in a symphonic
production. In uttering such a sentence, the speaker knows what
is in the listener’s mind, and has no need to elaborate further.
She also knows that the listener knows what’s in her mind. In
this sense, conversational language, at least, serves as a series of
prompts to guide shared thought.
Disambiguation also involves projection into the future.
Through theory of mind, listeners can create an emulation of
what a speaker has just said, and use this to predict upcom-
ing words, meanings, and even grammatical categories. This can
not only disambiguate upcoming utterances, but also facilitate
rapid comprehension and help the listener deal with noisy input
(Pickering and Garrod, 2007). In these respects, then, language
draws on both theory of mind and mental time travel.
Contrary to the Chomskyan view of language, another ingre-
dient of language that may go well back in primate and even
mammalian evolution is symbolic understanding. Great apes and
even dogs are easily taught to understand symbols in terms of
what they represent. The bonobo Kanzi communicates by point-
ing at nonrepresentational symbols on a keyboard, and can even
obey simple requests conveyed through spoken English (Savage-
Rumbaugh et al., 1998). The gorilla Koko is said to use over 1000
signs and to understand and express signed requests, and he too
can respond meaningfully to simple requests spoken in English
(Patterson and Gordon, 2001). A border collie called Rico has
been shown to rapidly acquire the meanings of some 200 spo-
ken English words (Kaminsky et al., 2004). Rico has since been
trumped by another border collie called Chaser, who understands
over 1000 proper names as verbal referents (Pilley and Reid,
2011). These accomplishments might also be taken to reflect men-
tal time travel, since they often involve reference to non-present
objects or actions. For instance, Kanzi might point to a symbol to
request a banana, or ask to be tickled, or invite play, and Rico and
Chaser demonstrate their linguistic skills by going on request into
another room to fetch a designated object.
Some birds, too, may have the capacity to understand symbols.
For instance Alex, a gray parrot, evidently understood number
symbols as abstract representation of assemblages of real-world
objects in much the same way as apes and small children do.
According to Pepperberg (2013), moreover, he learned them
more in a human-like than an ape-like fashion. Unlike apes and
dogs Alex, like other parrots, was able to produce reasonable
simulations of human speech.
GESTURAL ORIGINS, AND THE SWITCH TO SPEECH
The main impediment to language-like communication in apes
and dogs is a deficiency not so much in symbolic understanding
as in the means to produce symbols intentionally. Kanzi needs
an artificially contrived keyboard to communicate his requests,
and Rico and Chaser can understand words but have no means of
producing them, or of acquiring surrogates such as signed ges-
tures. Non-human species of course do communicate through
calls and cries, but these are for the most part outside of inten-
tional control. Even chimpanzees, according to Premack (2007),
“lack voluntary control of their voice” (p. 13866). The more likely
option for intentional communication in our primate precur-
sors lay in the hands. Premack goes on to write that chimpanzees
“could not have speech. But sign language is a possibility, for they
do have voluntary control of their hands” (p. 13866). As the exam-
ples of Kanzi and Koko illustrate, apes can learn to communicate
through gestures, whether based on sign language or on pointing
to visual symbols, but their production of symbols is far less pro-
ficient than their ability to understand them—as indeed it is also
in human infants.
The idea that language evolved from manual gestures has
a long history, going back at least to Condillac (1746/1971)
in the 18th century, and restated in modern form by Hewes
(1973). The gestural theory was boosted with the discovery in
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monkeys of mirror neurons, so called because they respond both
when the monkey makes a grasping movement and when it
observed the same movement performed by another individ-
ual (Rizzolatti et al., 1988). Mirror neurons are now consid-
ered part of a more extensive mirror system, involving regions
in the ventral prefrontal cortex, parietal cortex, and superior
temporal sulcus (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010), and in fact
overlapping extensively with the default network. The idea that
mirror neurons may underlie the evolution of language has
been elaborated by a number of authors (e.g., Corballis, 2002;
Arbib, 2005; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2008). The gestural the-
ory was also boosted by the realization that the signed lan-
guages of the deaf are true languages, with full syntactic and
semantic properties, albeit based entirely on visible movements
of the hands and face (Armstrong et al., 1995; Armstrong,
1999).
The question then is why authors like Chomsky and Tattersall
are so insistent that language emerged as a single package within
the past 100,000 years. Their reasoning appears to be based at
least in part on archeological evidence for what had been termed
a “cultural revolution” within the past 100,000 years, character-
ized by the seemingly abrupt appearance of bodily ornamentation
derived from shells, beads, or animal teeth, of sophisticated cave
art, and improved technology in tool making. Summarizing this
evidence, Mellars (2005) writes:
To describe the Upper Paleolithic revolution in Europe as reflect-
ing preeminently an explosion in explicitly symbolic behavior and
expression is in no sense an exaggeration, as most prehistorians
would now agree. We are probably on safe ground in assuming
that symbolic behavior and expression of this level of complexity
would be inconceivable in the absence of highly structured lan-
guage systems and brains closely similar, if not identical to, our
own (p. 12).
Nevertheless, not all prehistorians are in agreement. McBrearty
and Brooks (2000) write of the “revolution that wasn’t,” sug-
gesting a more gradual rise in technological sophistication from
the Middle Stone Age around 250,000–300,000 years ago, and
Shea (2011) similarly argues that human technology over the
past 200,000 years is characterized by a variability that persists
today, rather than by the abrupt appearance of “modern behav-
ior.” Given that our species is estimated to have emerged some
200,000 years ago, it seems unlikely that there was a dramatic
rewiring of the brain within the past 100,000 years.
One possibility is that any change in behavioral patterns in
our species was the outcome, not of a rewiring of the brain, nor
of the “unimaginable transition” declared by Tattersall (2012),
but was the outcome of a change in the manner of communi-
cation. I suggested above that language may have originated in
manual gestures, and of course it persists in this form in the
signed languages of the deaf. If this scenario is correct, then,
it must have switched to the vocal form that we call speech at
some point. Some have argued against the gestural theory on the
grounds that it must have required an unlikely transition from
a visuo-manual format to an auditory-vocal one (e.g., Burling,
2005; MacNeilage, 2012). However, in my view the transition
is better viewed not as a switch of modalities, but rather as a
switch in gestural format. In a recent analysis of the neural mech-
anisms of speech articulation, Bouchard et al. (2011) conclude
that their findings “support gestural theories of speech con-
trol over alternative acoustic . . . or vocal-tract geometry theories”
(p. 331).
The switch from manual to voiced language was proba-
bly gradual, with facial gestures playing an intermediary role.
Signed languages include silent movements of the face as
well as of the hands. Facial expressions and head movements
can turn an affirmative sentence into a negation, or a ques-
tion. Mouth gestures are especially important, and have been
linked to the equivalent of phonology, especially in European
signed languages. Explicit schemes for the phonological com-
position of mouth movements have been proposed for a num-
ber of European Sign languages, including Swedish, English,
and Italian (Sutton-Spence and Boyes-Braem, 2001). Mouth
gestures can serve to disambiguate hand gestures, and as
part of more general facial gestures provide the equivalent
of prosody in speech (Emmorey, 2002). Gestures of the face
and head also accompany normal speech, including raised eye-
brows, winking, down-turning the mouth, tilting or shaking the
head.
Speech itself can be regarded as a gestural system, com-
prising movements of the lips, the larynx, the velum, and the
blade, body, and root of the tongue (Studdert-Kennedy, 2005).
In the course of evolution, then, intentional communication
may have evolved from manual gestures, to overt facial ges-
tures, and finally to the largely hidden gestures that comprise
speech—although all three forms of gesture remain present in
conversation. Speech gestures, although largely contained within
the mouth, retain a visible component, as illustrated by the
McGurk effect: A syllable (such as da) is dubbed onto a mouth
saying another syllable (such as ba), and people tend to “hear”
what they see rather than what was actually voiced (McGurk
and MacDonald, 1976). Other studies show the parts of the
brain involved in producing speech are activated when peo-
ple simply watch silent videos of people speaking (Calvert and
Campbell, 2003; Watkins et al., 2003). Rhesus monkeys also
show dynamic interactions between perceptions of face move-
ments and voicing, mediated by connections between the supe-
rior temporal sulcus and auditory cortex (Ghazanfar et al.,
2008).
The transition was probably not a dramatic one, since move-
ments of the hand and mouth are coordinated in activities
such as eating, and hand movements and mouth movements
mutually interact (Bernardis and Gentilucci, 2006; Gentilucci
and Corballis, 2006). The introduction of voicing to the ges-
tural repertoire probably also involved modification of neu-
ral mechanisms, including a direct connection between the
motor cortex and the nucleus ambiguus (a midbrain vocal-
ization center) that seems to be unique to humans (Jürgens,
2002), and that may explain why vocalization is under pre-
cise voluntary control in humans but not in chimpanzees.
The continuing link between speech and gesture is further
illustrated by the fact that people habitually gesture with
their hands as they speak. Moreover gestures are in strict
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synchrony with speaking, implying a common underlying source
(McNeill, 1985).
The switch from manual gesture to speech may well have
been the change that led to the dominance of Homo sapiens,
perhaps even leading to the demise of the other large-brained
hominins, including the Neanderthals and the recently identi-
fied Denisovans. Although we habitually gesture manually while
speaking, manual movements can be disengaged, and play no
role in communicating by phone or on radio. Speech, then, may
be regarded as an early example of miniaturization, tucking lan-
guage output neatly into the mouth. This resulted in increased
energy efficiency. Manual language is effortful, requiring con-
siderable expenditure of energy, while the physiological costs of
speech are so low as to be nearly unmeasurable (Russell et al.,
1998). Speech adds little to the cost of breathing, which we must
do anyway to sustain life. Speech also allows communication
at night, or when speaker and audience are not in visual con-
tact. More importantly, perhaps, the transition to speech freed
the rest of the body for other activities, including the use and
manufacture of tools. This compartmentalization and increase in
communicative efficiency may well explain the survival and dom-
inance of our species, whether it occurred as part of the cultural
revolution or as a more gradual change over the past 200,000
years.
The emergence of speech as the dominant mode may well have
enhanced story-telling, and the sharing of cultural myths and leg-
ends that do much to bind societies together. Boyd (2009) points
out that religious ideas derive their power less from doctrine than
from stories, and stories told orally were passed down the genera-
tions with remarkable fidelity before the invention of writing. But
the invention of writing has also had a profound effect on human
culture, as have more recent inventions such as the Internet and
cellphone. The story of human progress may well be in large part
the story of advances in communication, and the switch from ges-
tural to vocal communication was an early example. The switch,
moreover, may have been more a blend from one to the other, and
is still arguably incomplete—especially in Italy.
CONCLUSIONS
It is widely held that humans evolved a distinctive mode of think-
ing, which included language, in a single step within the past
100,000 years. One important aspect of language is that it permits
intentional communication about the non-present, allowing peo-
ple to share their mental time travels—their experiences, plans,
and ideas. It has also been argued that the capacity for mental
time travel itself is uniquely human, perhaps evolving in concert
with language.
Neurophysiological recordings from rat hippocampus raise
the possibility that mental time travel may have ancient origins.
This casts a different perspective on the nature of cognitive evo-
lution, and suggests an incremental approach more consistent
with Darwinian theory. The cognitive underpinnings of language
include not only mental time travel, but also theory of mind and
the capacity to attach symbols to real-world entities. The evolu-
tion of productive language also required an intentional system
with sufficient flexibility to produce the requisite variety of out-
puts to serve as meaningful symbols. In our primate predecessors,
such a system was more likely to have been found in the hands
rather than the voice, supporting the idea that language evolved
from manual gestures.
The critical period for the evolution of language, then, was
likely to have been the Pleistocene, when the transition from a
forested environment to the more open savanna placed a survival
premium on social bonding and the sharing of experiences. The
capacity for mental time travel may have been extended to enable
longer-term plans and deeper access to the past. As evidence for
cognitive enhancement, brain size approximately tripled during
the Pleistocene (Wood and Collard, 1999). These developments
would have underpinnedmore effective communication, with the
emergence of obligate bipedalism adding to the communicative
power of gesture, initially by freeing the hands but also exposing
the rest of the body, including the face, as communicative systems.
The emergence of Homo sapiens from around 200,000 years
ago seems to have marked further cognitive advances. Our species
radiated out of Africa to eventually populate most of the globe,
while other equally large-brained hominins were driven to extinc-
tion. But rather than suppose that this was the result of some
unexplained event, perhaps a mutation, a more parsimonious
possibility, and one more consistent with Darwinian theory, is
that the emergence of Homo sapiens saw a gradual shift from a
predominantly manual language to a predominantly vocal one.
It may have been this shift that freed the hands for the remark-
able and ever increasing technological advances since the dawn
of our species (Corballis, 2004). Changes in the mode of com-
munication can have profound effects, the most recent exam-
ple being the invention of the Internet, and as communication
and ensuing technology grow more complex they progress in
ratchet like fashion, with each advance building on the previous
ones.
Language is characterized by what Chomsky (e.g., 2011) has
termed “discrete infinity,” the construction of potentially unlim-
ited meanings from finite elements. In his view, this capacity arose
in the singular event that created I-language and universal gram-
mar. The alternative is that the generative aspect of language is
provided by mind wandering, a capacity that may have ancient
origins. The rat that envisages a past or future trajectory may
not have infinite options, but does seem able to imagine trajec-
tories not actually experienced. Mental life no doubt gathered
more furniture in the course of evolution, as life itself imposed
more challenges. The pace changed with the emergence of the
bipedal hominins who were our forebears, as they adapted to
new habitats, began to develop tools, and formed more com-
plex social structures. Our mental travels are populated for the
most part by familiar elements, such as people, things, places,
and actions, which combine in different ways to make up our
memories, plans, and fantasies. The combinations are more or
less unlimited. With this elaboration, it would have been adaptive
to share, so that mental as well as physical resources could be dis-
tributed, and our hominin forebears could act and plan in groups.
Language itself, then, probably did emerge fairly late in hominin
evolution. The best guess, I think, is that language, along with
other aspects of social life, emerged in the Pleistocene, and not
as a sudden cataclysmic event within the time period of our own
species.
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